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Preface
When justice-involved youth are supervised by local agencies and placed with 
locally operated programs rather than being sent away to state facilities, they 
are better able to maintain community ties. They stay connected with their 
families and they are more likely to remain in local schools. Policy reforms that 
localize the justice system are often called “realignment.” New York’s “Close to 
Home” (or C2H) initiative is a prominent example of youth justice realignment. 
Launched in 2012, it is the latest chapter in a decade-long commitment by New 
York State and New York City to improve the justice system for young offenders 
by investing in programs and interventions that allow youth to stay close to their 
homes and families.
With primary support from the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation and 
additional funds from the Pinkerton Foundation, the Research & Evaluation 
Center at John Jay College of Criminal Justice reviewed the design and imple-
mentation of New York’s C2H initiative. Researchers collected data and other 
information about the reforms, interviewed many of the officials who designed 
and implemented them, and talked with staff from private provider agencies and 
advocacy organizations.
The study included at least one detailed interview with each of the following 
people (affiliations at the time of each interview):
Ronald Richter ACS, Commissioner
John Mattingly Annie E. Casey Foundation
Gladys Carrion OCFS, Commissioner
Felipe Franco OCFS, Deputy Commissioner
Ana Bermudez DOP, Deputy Commissioner
Vinny Schiraldi DOP, Commissioner
Mishi Faruquee ACLU, director of juvenile justice projects
Gabrielle Horowitz-Prisco Correctional Association, Juvenile Justice Project
Jeremy Kohomban Children’s Village, President and CEO
Nina Aledort OCFS, Associate Commissioner
Tim Roche OCFS, Associate Commissioner
Jacquelyn Greene DCJS, Director of Juvenile Justice Policy and 
Counsel to the Governor’s Deputy Secretary for 
Public Safety
Gail Nayowith St. Christopher Ottilie Family of Services, 
Executive Director
Sara Hemeter ACS, Associate Commissioner
Michele Sviridoff Office of the Criminal Justice Coordinator
Renee Petrucelli NYC Department of Education, Passages Academy
Timothy Lisante NYC Department of Education, Superintendent of 
District 79
Laurence Busching Office of the Criminal Justice Coordinator
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The policymakers, advocates and practitioners interviewed for this report 
provided the authors with valuable insights and information about the C2H 
initiative and the research team is very grateful for their participation and 
candor. Any opinions in the report other than those directly attributed to an 
interviewee are those of the authors alone.
A draft of this report was posted on the internet in May 2014 and discussed at 
the Spring Pinkerton Youth Justice Symposium at John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice in New York City. After the Symposium, readers of the draft 
report were invited to comment on the report and to suggest material that 
should be added. All comments were reviewed and incorporated into the text 
as appropriate.
Glossary of Acronyms
• ACD: Adjournment in Contemplation of 
Dismissal
• ACS: New York City Administration for 
Children’s Services
• APT: Adolescent Portable Therapy
• ATD: Alternative to Detention
• ATI: Alternative to Incarceration
• ATP: Alternative to Placement
• B4B: Brooklyn for Brooklyn
• C2H: Close to Home 
• CD: Conditional Discharge
• DJJ: Department of Juvenile Justice 
(former New York City agency)
• DOP: New York City Department of 
Probation 
• DCJS: New York State Division of Criminal 
Justice Services 
s
• IAP: Intensive Aftercare Program
• JD: Juvenile Delinquent
• JJI: Juvenile Justice Initiative
• JO: Juvenile Offender
• LSP: Limited-secure Placement
• MST: Multi-systemic Therapy
• NSP: Non-secure Placement
• NYC: New York City 
• OCFS: New York State Office of Children 
and Family Services 
• RAI: Risk Assessment Instrument
• SDM: Structured Decision Making 
• SP: Secure Placement
• YO: Youth Offender 
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Summary
State and local governments across the United States are implementing 
measures to reduce youth incarceration and invest more in programs 
that allow young people to stay connected to their homes and families. 
Policymakers have recognized that, by itself, incarceration is not an effective 
strategy for improving offender outcomes, reducing recidivism, and promoting 
public safety. Incarceration does not reduce and may actually increase the risk 
of reoffending— especially for young offenders who are sent far away from 
home and separated from their families for extended periods of time (Fabelo 
et al. 2015). Increasingly, public officials are reforming youth justice systems 
by relocating the bulk of their intervention resources at the local level. Many 
states are investing in community-based alternatives and some are closing 
down traditionally rural, state-operated youth correctional facilities.
In New York State during the 1990s and early 2000s, advocates and even some 
policymakers called for the State to redesign its youth justice system (e.g., 
Governor Paterson’s Task Force 2009). Lawmakers spent more than a 
decade implementing a set of policy reforms that promised to expand the use 
of community-based alternatives for young offenders. Everyone involved in 
these efforts shared a common goal — to create a system for justice-involved 
youth that would be less punitive, more rehabilitative, and more thoroughly 
grounded in research evidence and best practices.
In 2012, New York began a realignment effort known as Close to Home (or 
C2H). Two years later, many of the officials and practitioners involved in 
C2H still described it as “promising” or “encouraging.” Few were ready to 
call it completely successful. Everyone interviewed for this study, however, 
supported the general goals of C2H and the strategies being pursued by City 
and State agencies. It was not clear how to judge the long-term success of the 
initiative, but Close to Home appeared to be a sound investment for New York 
State and New York City.
Key Findings
1. According to the interviews conducted for this study, the Close to Home 
initiative was widely perceived to be an effective reform strategy for youth 
justice in New York. After two years of implementation, the initiative 
retained strong support from State officials, City officials, youth justice 
practitioners, and advocates.
2. The success of C2H cannot be assessed simply by tracking changes in 
placement numbers. The sharp decline in New York’s rate of residential 
placements after C2H may suggest to some that the initiative is an effective 
strategy, but the downward trend in placements began many years before 
C2H.
3. Opinions still vary as to the fundamental purposes of C2H. Was it 
intended to reduce the overall use of residential placements, or was it an 
effort to localize the residential system and replace state placements with 
local placements?
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
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4. Some professionals involved in the design of C2H argue that it was never 
simply about geography (i.e. the location of placements). It was intended to 
establish a better and more cost-effective balance of resources across the full 
dispositional continuum, including the wider use of community-based, non-
residential alternatives.
5. For many officials, present day costs are not the most critical indicator of 
C2H’s success. They believe that C2H should eventually make the youth 
justice system more cost-effective by generating better youth outcomes and 
lowering crime rates.
6. More than two years into the C2H initiative, New York City operates more 
(and perhaps better) placement facilities, but advocates worry that the full 
array of community alternatives remains under-utilized.
7. Some advocates interviewed for this study are worried that if new C2H-
funded placement facilities are of higher quality and produce better outcomes 
than the State’s now-closed facilities, New York City judges might be inspired 
to use placement more often than before.
8. Other stakeholders fear that C2H may have even hindered the momentum 
that was building for keeping justice-involved youth safely in the community. 
Instead, the youth justice system in New York City may have become more 
preoccupied with expanding youth placements — albeit the locally-operated 
placements everyone prefers.
9. Advocates ask a key question: “Was it ever reasonable to assume that the 
C2H initiative could build a high-quality placement system and simultane-
ously work to keep youth out of that system?”
10. Nearly all stakeholders interviewed for this study agree that the planning 
and implementation of C2H was rushed, but they also agree that rushing was 
probably necessary. The C2H initiative would have likely “died on the vine” 
had it not moved so quickly.
11. After nearly three years of experience, including a transition to a new Mayor 
and City administration, the Close to Home initiative appears to be estab-
lished policy. All stakeholders are eager to maintain the effort, although criti-
cisms and debates about particular strategies continue.
12. It is too early to tell whether the changes introduced by C2H have truly 
reformed New York City’s justice system or improved public safety, but key 
youth justice trends in New York City are actually more positive than in other 
areas of New York State. On balance, Close to Home seems to be a solid 
investment. 
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
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Introduction
During the 1990s and early 2000s, advocates and even some policymakers called for New York to redesign its youth 
justice system (e.g., Governor Paterson’s Task Force 2009). Beset by rising placement costs and poor youth outcomes, 
the youth justice system was built on policies and practices that institutionalized city youth in distant state facilities 
and disconnected them from their families. The City and State spent more than a decade implementing a set of policy 
reforms that promised to integrate new approaches for young offenders. Everyone involved in these efforts shared 
a similar goal — to create a system for youth that would be less punitive, more rehabilitative, and more thoroughly 
grounded in research evidence about adolescent development and family well-being. 
 Mayor Michael Bloomberg (2012)
 “A Landmark Overhaul”
click to watch
In 2012, the youth justice field watched closely as New York began an 
ambitious realignment effort: Close to Home (or C2H). The initiative was 
inspired by youth justice realignment efforts in other states (Butts and 
Evans 2011) and policymakers hoped that it would provide effective inter-
ventions for youth in their own communities. Close to Home shifted the 
custody of all but the most severe youthful offenders from New York State to 
New York City. It increased the number of youth receiving services in their 
home communities and it sustained the trend toward less frequent use of 
state-sponsored placements.
C2H was a multi-organizational effort. Agencies from both the State and 
City collaborated closely. State efforts were led by the Office of Children and 
Family Services (OCFS) and the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), 
while the leading City agencies were the Department of Probation (DOP) and 
Administration for Childrens’ Services (ACS). The driving assumption behind 
C2H was that keeping youth close to their families and communities would 
enable parents and guardians to be more involved in their child’s supervision 
and rehabilitation and to establish better relationships with educational 
and treatment supports. Youth could forge stronger connections with local 
resources during and after placement and the school credits they earned 
during placement could count towards their academic progress.
Close to Home was designed to unfold in two phases beginning with the 
lowest risk youth in the least restrictive settings. During Phase 1, the City 
created a residential system for the lowest risk youth — those typically held 
in the “non-secure” facilities operated by the State’s OCFS. From September 
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
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2012 to May 2013, City youth housed at these State facilities were transferred 
to new programs in New York City. After September 2012, as low-risk youth 
were newly adjudicated by family courts in the City, they were to be placed in 
the new locally-operated programs.
Phase 2 of C2H would add new placement facilities for youth in the next 
highest risk category—those held in the State’s “limited-secure” facilities. City 
youth already housed at State-sponsored limited-secure facilities would be 
transferred to the new local system and newly adjudicated limited-secure cases 
were to be placed directly in the new City-based system.
Phase 2 was originally projected to launch in early 2013. By the end of 2014, 
however, it was two years behind schedule and City officials announced that 
it would launch in March 2015. Some officials acknowledged that the original 
plan for the limited-secure phase of the initiative was probably never feasible. 
According to some City leaders, the initial plan for how and when to move 
forward with the limited-secure phase of the C2H initiative was always seen as 
tentative by those most involved in its design and implementation.
The 2014 change in New York City’s mayoral administration introduced 
many changes in city government. Some central players in the design of C2H 
changed jobs, including some leaders from the very state agencies that helped 
to conceptualize C2H. Several key State agency leaders took new positions with 
the City. Most stakeholders interviewed for this report remained optimistic 
about the new appointments and the C2H initiative. 
Key Questions
Beginning with the earliest conversations about C2H, the initiative was widely 
perceived as a promising reform, but how well would the new concepts and 
practices be implemented? How confident could the public be that this new 
approach to youth justice in New York would lead to better outcomes? Answers 
to these questions were only starting to emerge three years into the initiative. 
Close to Home was obviously a complex initiative that involved the cooperation 
and coordination of a variety of government and community agencies. The goal 
of this report is to examine the initial phases of C2H implementation and to 
highlight varying points of view expressed by key stakeholders.
[Close to Home is designed] to make sure kids have the right programs at the 
right time, that those who pose a danger are in locked facilities with appropriate 
services, and those who are not [dangerous] are close to families, schools, and 
communities that can help them to become law-abiding citizens.
— Elizabeth Glazer, 2012  (to NBC New York)
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
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The report addresses questions such as:
• Who were the key individuals and agencies that made C2H happen?
• What issues affected the negotiation and planning phase?
• What issues affected implementation?
• Did C2H lead to significant reductions in out-of-home placements?
• Would C2H eventually save taxpayer dollars or was it simply replacing one 
expensive system with another?
• What lessons were learned during Phase 1 of C2H that could help State 
and City officials ensure the success of Phase 2?
Before the Reforms
Close to Home was part of a decade-long effort to correct budgetary incentives, 
improve services, and achieve positive outcomes for youth and families 
involved with New York’s justice system. The need for reform was apparent 
years before C2H. The costs of youth justice, for example, increased consid-
erably through the 1990s and early 2000s. Total costs rose 24 percent in one 
five-year period, from $202 million in 2003 to $251 million in 2008 (New York 
City Independent Budget Office 2008), and this was during a time of falling 
crime rates, declining placements, and growing reliance on less-expensive 
community alternatives (Figure 1).
System-wide costs remained high at least in part because State policies 
required OCFS to keep residential facilities open and fully staffed even as the 
number of youth requiring placement dropped along with the rate of serious 
youth crime. Placement costs per youth exploded as a result. Youth outcomes, 
however, were not improving. One OCFS analysis found that 66 percent of 
youth released from State placement facilities were re-arrested within two 
years (NYS OCFS 2011).
Policymakers and practitioners were frustrated by the continued problems. 
By 2010, OCFS facilities were under review by federal investigators and New 
York City had filed a lawsuit contending that the State was overcharging for 
placement services. The State and City eventually agreed on a set of reforms, 
The real challenge with the future of Close to Home is to create structures – 
incentives and disincentives – that will keep this going if the political winds shift 
again. To institutionalize these reforms going forward, we need a clear road 
map for the reinvestment of resources to fund and sustain the continuum of 
community based alternatives to incarceration that we built so that the reforms 
outlive the personalities involved and the conditions that came together to make 
this happen.
— Ana Bermudez, 2013
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
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including downsizing of under-utilized facilities and some of the policy changes 
that would eventually become known as Close to Home. The State agreed to 
transfer most young offenders from New York City to local custody. Suddenly, 
New York City had gotten what it was asking for — the City’s youth would not 
be going upstate in large numbers following their adjudication as “juvenile 
delinquents” (JDs) or “juvenile offenders” (JOs). They- would be staying closer 
to the City. Now what?
City Reforms
The reforms associated with C2H did not happen overnight. New York City’s 
juvenile detention and placement practices were under intense scrutiny long 
before 2012. In 2003, the New York City Department of Probation (DOP) 
launched “Project Zero,” an effort to reduce the City’s over-reliance on detention 
and out-of-home placement. The DOP increased the use of “adjustments” (or, 
diverting cases from the formal process) in order to expand the use of commu-
nity-based services. Successful adjustments increased as a result. At one point, 
successful adjustments grew 12 percent in just two years (Division of Criminal 
Justice Services 2013).
In 2006, responding to skyrocketing detention costs and poor recidivism 
outcomes, City officials initiated a series of reforms designed to reduce over-reli-
ance on detention and expand community alternatives. The efforts were twofold: 
1) City agencies pledged to use more data in making case-specific detention 
decisions; and 2) the City administration promised to build a broader array of 
community-based alternatives.
The City also commissioned New York’s Vera Institute of Justice to assist in 
the development of a formal risk assessment instrument (RAI). The RAI 
provided added information for structured decision-making to clarify the risks 
of recidivism posed by individual youth and to ensure that pre-court detention 
was used only for high-risk youth.
Some advocates interviewed for this study expressed concern about the potential 
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Source:  
New York State Office 
of Children and Family 
Services. Juvenile 
Justice Annual Update 




Between 2003 and 
2012, placements 
declined more among 
New York City youth 
than among other youth 
(–63% vs –56%).
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agencies become accustomed to viewing youth through the lens of risk scores, 
experts warn that decision-makers may lose sight of the epistemic origins 
of risk measures. Risk assessment scores are heavily weighted on a youth’s 
prior record of justice involvement (i.e. previous arrests, offenses, and adju-
dications). Thus, risk scores are at least partly, if not largely, composed of the 
previous decisions made by police, prosecutors, and judges. Measured risk 
is essentially a composite of how other justice officials have viewed a young 
offender in the past. To the extent that their views were tarnished by bias or 
hostility, this collective animus is inherently bound up in a youth’s current risk 
assessment score.
Still, most officials agreed that the adoption of the RAI signaled a major 
paradigm shift in the City’s youth justice system. No longer would judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys be expected to rely on “gut instincts” or 
unfounded assumptions about the risks young people pose to public safety. 
City officials now had a common metric and standard vocabulary for discussing 
policy options and the factors thought to be predictive of risk and recidivism.
As the RAI was being developed and piloted, NYC officials also designed a 
wider continuum of “alternative to detention” (ATD) programs and the City 
solicited proposals for programs that would be consistent with the new regime 
of structured decision-making. In addition to improving the rational basis of 
detention utilization, the structured decision-making approach allowed the 
City to triage resources for low, medium, and high-risk youth across the full 
range of community-based services.
Before C2H, the DOP and ACS agreed to expand the availability of existing 
community-based “alternative to placement” (ATP) programs as well, which 
included the Vera Institute’s Esperanza program and ACS’ own Juvenile 
Justice Initiative (JJI). These programs served delinquent youth who may 
otherwise be placed out of their homes, including some at risk for secure 
settings. Esperanza was a comprehensive community program that provided 
family counseling, intensive supervision and resources to the juvenile justice 
population and their families. JJI employed an array of evidence based, family 
focused interventions that included multidimensional treatment foster care, 
functional family therapy, and multi-systemic therapy (ACS 2012).
In 2008, New York City implemented a Weekend/Holiday Arraignment 
Initiative. This initiative expanded the processing of juvenile cases from 
weekdays only to include weekends and holidays as well, thus reducing time 
in custody for defendants awaiting court processing. In 2010, the City also 
restructured the management of the detention system. The former Department 
of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) became part of the city’s child welfare agency, ACS. 
With the merger, ACS began to operate a full array of non-secure and secure 
detention facilities in the City (Cannon, Aborn and Bennet 2010).
Categories of Young Offenders Under 
New York Law 
During the development of Close to 
Home, New York’s youth justice system 
designated three types of young 
offenders: 
• Juvenile Delinquents: at least age 7 
but less than age 16, and referred to 
family court for an act of delinquency 
that would constitute a crime if 
committed by an adult;
• Juvenile Offenders: ages 13, 14, or 15 
and charged with a relatively serious 
crime in (adult) criminal court; and
• Youthful Offenders: ages 16 to 18 
and automatically handled in criminal 
court.
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
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Together, these new approaches had begun to create a culture shift in New 
York City’s juvenile justice system well before the launch of C2H. Judges 
and prosecutors became accustomed to a more rehabilitative climate, had 
a broader array of options at their disposal and began to send more youth to 
community-based programs. As NYC youth justice practice came increasingly 
under the control of child welfare policy makers at ACS, and as the youth crime 
rate continued to fall across New York and the entire country, the population 
of youth in upstate placement facilities was shrinking rapidly (Figure 2). 
According to State officials and NYC practitioners, however, the youth who 
remained in placement represented a higher-risk cohort.
State Reforms
The C2H initiative was preceded by several critical developments at the 
State level as well. In particular, Gladys Carrión’s 2007 appointment as 
Commissioner of OCFS set in motion a series of reforms. Almost immediately 
upon assuming the leadership of OCFS, she began to press for down-sizing, or 
“right-sizing” the youth justice system, which meant drastically reducing the 
capacity of the upstate youth facilities that swelled during the youth crime 
scares of the 1980s and 1990s.
Carrión implemented several reforms to facilitate change. For example, OCFS 
began to address longstanding concerns about lengths of stay in its youth 
facilities. In 2007, the mean length of stay for youth in State-operated facilities 
was 11 months, while the mean length of stay for youth placed with private 
agencies was 13 months (NYS OCFS 2009). The agency sought to reduce 
lengths of stay by contracting with New York City’s Children’s Aid Society 
and others to provide aftercare supports for youth returning from State-run 
facilities and by establishing an Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) for youth 
released from private facilities. With more aftercare options, OCFS was able 
to shorten the mean length of stay for youth in State-operated facilities to 9 
months; private agency stays fell to 11 months on average (NYS OCFS 2009).
The IAP program included electronic monitoring, day placement programs, 
evening reporting centers, and evidence-informed community therapy 
programs like Adolescent Portable Therapy (APT) and Multi-systemic Therapy 
(MST). OCFS collaborated with ACS to create the JJI Intensive Preventive 
Aftercare Services (IPAS), a Functional Family Therapy-based program that 
provided aftercare services for youth and their families. Facility populations 
began to fall dramatically, partly due to these reforms but aided by the steep 
drop in youth crime that occurred in New York and the nation as a whole after 
the 1990s.
These reforms were not welcomed by everyone. Some officials interviewed 
for this study acknowledged that New York’s private residential providers 
were becoming concerned at this time about the trend toward less residential 
utilization. The survival of private agencies obviously depends on a steady flow 
The Juvenile Justice Process in 
New York City
After an alleged “juvenile delinquent” 
is arrested in New York City, the 
Department of Probation (DOP) is 
responsible for determining if the case 
should be dismissed, adjusted (i.e. 
diverted) or referred to the prosecutor 
for formal processing. If referred, the 
city’s Law Department may reconsider 
adjustment, release the youth, or 
prosecute. 
The DOP conducts an intake process 
with youth referred for prosecution 
and a probation officer assesses the 
youth’s risk either for “failure to appear” 
in court, or for re-offending during the 
course of the court process. 
Based on its assessment, the DOP 
recommends one of three detention 
actions: 1) release the youth, 2) refer 
the youth to an alternative to detention 
(or, ATD) program, or 3) hold the youth in 
detention (secure or “non-secure”).
A delinquency petition is filed and 
reviewed in a fact-finding hearing, where 
a judge may again decide to release, 
adjourn, or postpone the case, or the 
court may adjudicate the youth as a 
delinquent. 
When a youth is adjudicated, the DOP 
forwards a disposition recommendation 
to the court. Options include dismissal, 
“adjournment in contemplation of 
dismissal” (ACD), conditional discharge 
(CD), probation supervision, placement 
in an alternative (ATP) program, or 
another placement. 
Before the C2H initiative, NYC juvenile 
delinquents could be placed with a local 
department of social services or be 
held under OCFS (state) custody, which 
included public facilities and private 
agencies contracted by OCFS. Most of 
the OCFS and private facilities were 
located upstate, sometimes hours away 
from New York City.
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
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of clients. According to several observers, the State’s larger private agencies 
began to lobby the courts to send an increasing proportion of placement-
bound youth to them. If this is true, the effort appeared to succeed. By 2011, 
921 juvenile delinquents were placed in private agency settings statewide 
while only 268 were placed in public facilities, reversing a long-standing 
pattern from earlier years (NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services 2012).
The shift toward private placements was an eye-opener for City and State 
officials, both in terms of program quality and fiscal policy. Youth placed 
with private agencies were in State (OCFS) custody, but local governments 
were expected to pay 100 percent of the bill for private placements, compared 
with a 50-50 split for placements in State-operated facilities. In other words, 
just as the State was working to shorten its residential lengths of stay and 
to improve the quality of aftercare services, private placement agencies — 
where shorter lengths of stay and extended aftercare were essentially bad 
for business — began to capture a larger share of the declining number of 
placements. In New York City, the statewide shift from OCFS-operated 
facilities to private placements billed at 100 percent increased the urgency for 
reforming the placement system. Some officials involved in C2H described 
this development as the “final straw” that forced the City to act.
State officials also saw a need for action. Under the leadership of 
Commissioner Carrión, a broad State-level reform agenda had already 
begun to take hold. OCFS was working to enhance the role of families and 
communities in the rehabilitation of the youth throughout the services 
spectrum. New staff training initiatives were bringing agency practices in 
line with the best, evidence-informed principles, particularly around positive 
youth development approaches and services for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, and Questioning (LGBTQ) youth (ACS 2013a).
Source:  
Bermudez, Ana and 
Mark Ferrante (2012). 
The New York City 
Juvenile Justice Reform 
Story: Realignment and 
the New York City Model 
of Juvenile Probation. 
Presentation at the CJJ 






























Before the launch of 
Close to Home, the 
numbers of youth in all 
types of State placement 
facilities had been 
shrinking rapidly. 
 Gladys Carrión (2013)
 “We were very transparent.”
click to watch
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Other precursors to C2H included the Brooklyn for Brooklyn initiative (or, 
B4B), a pilot program designed to work with young offenders closer to their 
families and to improve the overall quality of services for City youth. The B4B 
initiative promoted a therapeutic, community-based model focused on positive 
youth development (Vera Institute of Justice 2013). A number of people 
interviewed for this study saw B4B as a working laboratory f0r C2H. State 
officials continued their support for B4B until 2013, when the State sold the 
residential facility to the City so it could become part of the C2H initiative. The 
early success of B4B and the obvious need for such a model may have helped to 
inspire the development of C2H.
A System in Turmoil
City and State reforms were yielding positive and encouraging results even before 
the launch of Close to Home — aided by the national decline in youth crime. 
Rates of serious youth crime today are half what they were in the mid-1990s 
(Butts and Evans 2014). There were many competing explanations. Youth 
growing up in the 1980s and 90s may have begun to reject the lifestyle they came 
to associate with drug use and criminal activity as they observed older siblings 
and friends getting arrested. The declining size of the youth population may have 
contributed to the reduction, or perhaps the many changes associated with digital 
communications and social media led youth to pursue fewer illegal activities. One 
always-popular explanation is that growth in the use of incarceration after 1980 
increased the deterrent effect of the justice system overall. Most careful research, 
however, suggests that rising incarceration alone explains only a small portion of 
the crime decline. 
Regardless of the causes, however, the falling rate of serious youth crime was 
associated with a declining demand for placements. The number of New York 
City youth coming into the justice system dropped sharply in the years leading 
up to C2H. Between 2006 and 2012, juvenile arrests for major felonies in New 
York City dipped 27 percent (ACS 2013a) and the average daily population in 
detention dropped 29 percent (City of New York 2010; 2012). From 2006 to 2011, 
the number of youth placed in OCFS custody statewide plummeted 47 percent 
(Division of Criminal Justice Services 2012). New York City placements dropped 
by two-thirds from 2005 to 2012, beginning seven years before the launch of the 
C2H initiative (ACS 2013a).
These trends encouraged the dramatic changes at OCFS. Within a year of being 
appointed OCFS Commissioner, Gladys Carrión shifted resources away from the 
State’s residential facilities and into community alternatives. From October 2007 
to September 2013, the State closed 23 youth facilities and reduced capacity in 
others. Overall, OCFS reduced its residential capacity by more than 1,000 beds.
Yet, problems continued to plague the youth justice system. In 2007, the 
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice launched an investigation 
into conditions in several of the State’s residential facilities for young offenders. 
Levels of Placement
During the development of the C2H 
initiative, state-operated facilities in 
New York had three security levels: 
secure placement (SP), limited 
secure placement (LSP) and non-
secure placement (NSP). 
Non-secure placement (NSP) 
facilities generally housed 22 to 50 
youth and did not have perimeter 
fencing. 
Limited secure placement (LSP) 
facilities usually housed between 
25 to 183 youth and some were 
surrounded by a barbed wire. 
Secure placement (SP) facilities 
were the most restrictive residential 
programs, surrounded by barbed 
wire with other secure hardware. 
They housed 30 to 180 youth (see 
Task Force on Transforming Juvenile 
Justice 2009). 
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The findings of the investigation were delivered to the Governor’s office in 
August 2009. The DOJ charged that treatment services for youth in State-run 
facilities were inadequate and that conditions were often abusive.
According to the DOJ findings letter sent to the Governor, the federal 
investigation found that:
1) staff resort quickly to a high degree of force that is disproportionate 
to the level of the youth’s infraction; and 2) the technique employed 
to restrain a youth results in an excessive number of injuries. We 
also found that investigations into uses of force and restraints were 
inadequate and that, in many instances, OCFS failed to hold staff 
accountable for gross violations of OCFS policy on the use of force and 
restraints.
According to DOJ,
[The] staff at the facilities routinely used uncontrolled, unsafe applica-
tions of force, departing both from generally accepted standards and 
OCFS policy. Anything from sneaking an extra cookie to initiating a 
fist fight may result in a full prone restraint with handcuffs. This one-
size-fits-all control approach has not surprisingly led to an alarming 
number of serious injuries to youth, including concussions, broken or 
knocked-out teeth, and spiral fractures.
After the release of the DOJ report, Commissioner Carrión met with New 
York’s family court judges and recommended that they refrain from sending 
any more youths to OCFS unless the youth posed significant risks to public 
safety. In October 2009, court administrators sent a similar memorandum 
to judges encouraging them to refer youth to community resources instead of 
sending them to placement (Storey 2010).
Meanwhile, then-Governor David Paterson launched the Task Force on 
Transforming Juvenile Justice. The task force released its report in 
December 2009. The report recommended further drastic decreases in the 
use of residential placements for youth, as well as the creation of a compre-
hensive menu of alternatives to placement and stronger reentry programs.
This is just a bad model. It was established in the 1800s by people who wanted to 
get Irish kids out of inner cities, and have them breathe fresh air and slop pigs — 
assuming that would rehabilitate them — and then send them back to the city to be 
good little boys and girls. The model never made much sense. People were complain-
ing about it almost immediately. We’re still complaining about it today. It’s like using 
leeches to cure cancer.
— Vincent Schiraldi, 2013
 Jeremy Kohomban (2014)
 “This is a system that’s black and brown.”
click to watch
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The State also faced civil litigation. In December 2009, the non-profit Legal 
Aid Society filed a class action suit against OCFS. The suit alleged ongoing 
civil rights violations and argued that OCFS facilities deprived youth of 
essential mental health services and that staff used unconstitutional and 
excessive force to control youth (Storey 2010). The lawsuit was eventually 
settled with OCFS consenting to significant policy changes. More than a 
dozen individual plaintiffs received substantial settlements and the lawyers 
who brought the case claimed $1 million in fees.
The pressures continued to mount. In 2010, newly elected Governor Andrew 
Cuomo visited OCFS’s Tryon Residential Center, a limited secure facility 
that OCFS had scheduled for closure. The Governor saw a fully staffed but 
empty campus, as OCFS was legislatively required to continue staffing the 
facility during the closure process. The visit was covered heavily by statewide 
media as a symbol of fiscal waste and negligence in the State system. The 
following year, the State agreed to a $3.5 million settlement in a five-year-old 
lawsuit centering on the negligent death of a 15-year-old at Tryon.
Meanwhile, the number of City youth placed with OCFS dropped 62 percent 
between 2002 and 2011, causing daily costs per youth to swell 150 percent 
(Bermudez and Ferrante 2012). With the public increasingly aware of the 
staggering price tag associated with the State’s faltering system of residential 
facilities, New York City officials were emboldened to act. The logical next 
step was for the City to assume full responsibility for its own youth and to 
keep them out of expensive facilities located hours away from their homes 
and families.
In January 2011, Laurence Busching, then Executive Commissioner of the 
Division of Youth and Family Justice at ACS, and Vincent Schiraldi, then 
Commissioner of DOP testified before the New York City Council on the 
need for City officials to act. They pointed out that under the existing policy 
structure, New York City paid $17 million more in 2010 than it did in 2002 
for its share of an increasingly unnecessary State custody system. The 
financial drain would only worsen and render the City unable to invest in 
creating a new and much-needed system to serve its own youth.
 Vincent Schiraldi (2010)
 “Bad outcomes flow freely out of these  
 places.”
click to watch
[J]uvenile crime, continued to go down as we were closing facilities, as we were 
reducing the number of kids coming into care... [W]e showed that kids could be 
safely in the community, and that we could do a different model and approach, 
move from a correctional model to more of a rehabilitative [and] developmental 
approach in dealing with young people.
— Gladys Carrión, 2013
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Youth advocacy groups were another critical part of the story. Groups like the 
Correctional Association of New York warned that current practices discon-
nected youth from their families and returned them to their home communities 
worse than they were before placement. The advocates placed special emphasis 
on the harm of educational disruptions during placement. While youth always 
had the opportunity to earn credits during placement, the credits did not 
always count toward their academic progress when they came home, causing 
at-risk and disconnected youth to fall behind or to withdraw entirely from 
school (Bloomberg 2012).
In short, an array of factors combined to create the perfect conditions for 
reform. The State faced serious fiscal, administrative, and legal pressures. 
Upstate secure facilities were seen to be a waste of resources that sometimes 
caused serious harm to young people. The juvenile defense bar and youth 
advocacy community were making frequent calls for fundamental reform. 
Meanwhile, the national youth crime decline was lowering the temperature on 
all crime policy debates.
The City had been tinkering with procedural and structural reforms for more 
than a decade. By 2012 it seemed that lawmakers might be able to do the right 
thing. In this case, the right thing was to dismantle a system that relied on 
expensive facilities in upstate New York and to create a locally operated system 
with better access to alternative programs and — in cases where youth did 
have to be removed from their homes — placements that were closer to their 
families and neighborhoods in New York City.
Negotiating Reform
Practitioners strongly supported the principles behind Close to Home, but 
a number of obstacles complicated efforts to build broader support among 
State and City officials. Youth justice had become less of a priority for elected 
officials after the violent crime scares of the 1990s subsided. Political issues 
associated with youth crime seemed less urgent. Young people also made up a 
relatively small portion of the overall justice system. Whatever political energy 
remained to deal with ongoing problems of crime and violence tended to focus 
Our system... is black kids and brown kids. ... They’re coming from a few 
neighborhoods that have been historically segregated. Our work is about social 
“injustice.” ... We work in a system that is inherently unjust. ... We [need to] remind 
ourselves everyday that this is a system that’s black and brown. It’s not white and it’s 
not Asian.  
— Jeremy Kohomban, 2014
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on adults, which in New York State included all offenders age 16 and older. In 
addition, the economic problems that began with the recession of 2008-2009 
continued to affect government. Officials in 2012 likely viewed dramatic 
policy changes more skeptically than they would have before 2008.
A systematic reform effort of the magnitude of C2H required significant 
political support from multiple parties and constituencies, and it was 
sometimes difficult to identify the right champions for change. Designing 
and implementing any change process can be arduous. The planning 
process for Close to Home was no exception. City and State agencies had to 
collaborate to design an entirely new residential system for New York City’s 
juvenile delinquents. The effort to resolve conflicts of interest and to sort 
out the differing perspectives of various groups was expected to take many 
months. In the end, even those closely involved in the planning for C2H were 
surprised at just how complicated it became.
Two years after the launch of C2H, the key players still did not agree entirely 
about the factors that led City and State leaders to pursue the reforms. State 
officials credited OCFS with changing the mindset of lawmakers about youth 
justice because the agency shifted from a correctional model to a develop-
mental approach and expanded the focus on positive outcomes. The State 
closed more than 1,000 beds after 2007 and worked hard to free up the 
resources that would allow community programs to serve more youth. 
OCFS officials believed they contributed to New York’s receptiveness to C2H 
by openly addressing the challenges the new system would likely face as it 
tried to keep youth closer to their families. The agency also used language 
supportive of the initiative long before the initiative itself. Some officials 
pointed out that the phrase, “close to home,” was already part of a media 
campaign sponsored by the State to ease the closure of facilities outside of 
New York City. Some materials in that campaign asserted that correctional 
space in Upstate New York was no longer needed because OCFS wanted to 
keep youth “closer to home.” Similar ideas were expressed in the report of 
Governor Paterson’s Task Force in 2009.
City leaders, however, pointed out that some State officials actually opposed 
C2H in its earliest phases because legislators in Albany didn’t want State 
voters to see youth justice reform as a City initiative. Practitioners in the City 
often attributed the origins of C2H to practices developed by ACS workers 
who were trying to improve their services for teenagers caught in the child 
welfare and juvenile delinquency systems. They pointed to the similarities of 
C2H to systemic reforms undertaken by ACS in the early 2000s to integrate 
the child welfare and youth justice systems.
The City’s Department of Probation would point out that its staff had been 
working to establish more community alternatives long before the emergence 
of C2H. The DOP had created an array of Alternatives to Placement (ATP) 
 Gladys Carrión (2013)
 “Changing system culture is hard.”
click to watch
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programs to provide youth with community services and to limit the use of 
residential programs. Even some State officials acknowledged that C2H was 
consistent with reforms already being pursued by DOP.
Valid arguments are found on all sides. For many officials, it is not even 
important to assign the credit for Close to Home. Most officials interviewed for 
this study agreed that three key forces drove the implementation of Close to 
Home:
1) declining rates of serious youth crime in the City, the State, and the 
entire country;
2) ongoing fiscal pressures remaining from the 2008-2009 recession; 
and
3) a sincere desire among all officials to develop better programs to serve 
youth effectively and to reduce recidivism.
State and City leaders were equally determined to abandon the old punitive 
model and to invest in a more rehabilitative and community-centered 
approach.
Early Moves
In October 2010, City Commissioners Vincent Schiraldi (DOP) and John 
Mattingly (ACS) assembled an inter-agency group called the Dispositional 
Reform Steering Committee, subsequently known as the NYC Juvenile 
Justice Advisory Committee (JJAC). The JJAC included representatives 
from youth-related agencies as well as members of the advocacy community. 
The Commissioners asked the group to consider any and all strategies for 
reforming the NYC youth justice system.
Based on these discussions, Schiraldi and then ACS Deputy Commissioner 
Laurence Busching presented an ambitious C2H reform proposal to State 
officials. Governor Paterson’s Administration did not support the proposal at 
first, although State officials agreed on the need for a new approach for NYC 
youth. Commissioner Carrión (then at OCFS) worried the bill was put together 
If Close to Home is just the devolution of care from the state agency to kids being 
in private agencies, then it was not a success. But if Close to Home becomes an 
opportunity to really realign resources and invest in communities and families so that 
fewer kids have to be removed from their homes, then it will be a good thing.
— Felipe Franco, 2014
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very quickly and that a comprehensive plan required more time. In addition, 
some leading advocacy groups, including the Children’s Defense Fund, the 
Correctional Association, and Community Connections for Youth in the Bronx, 
did not support the bill at first. Some insiders suspected that the advocacy 
community was hesitant to back a proposal coming from the same City admin-
istration then supporting controversial policies such as stop-and-frisk and the 
closing of public schools in poor neighborhoods.
Resistance to the idea of C2H began to subside with the November 2010 
election of Governor Andrew Cuomo and his selection of Elizabeth Glazer to 
be Deputy Secretary for Public Safety (the top public safety position in New 
York State government). Glazer had been chair of the State’s Juvenile Justice 
Advisory Group under Governor Paterson. Her presence, combined with the 
essential support of John Feinblatt, Mayor Bloomberg’s Chief Advisor on 
criminal justice issues, helped to inspire the emerging consensus between City 
and State officials. Officials interviewed for this study also frequently noted the 
efforts of Tamara Steckler from Legal Aid in New York City as a key factor in 
facilitating productive conversations between the City and the State during the 
early phases of C2H.
Negotiations between the State and the City began in earnest approxi-
mately one year after the earliest conversations about C2H. Elizabeth Glazer 
represented State leadership and then-Deputy Mayor Linda Gibbs took the 
leading role for the City. Many of the details surrounding the initiative were 
managed by Jacquelyn Greene, Counsel to the Governor’s Deputy Secretary 
for Public Safety and a senior staff member at New York’s Division of Criminal 
Justice Services (DCJS). Several officials from OCFS, including Executive 
Deputy Commissioner William Gettman and a few staff members from the 
Division of Budget also played key roles. The City team included representa-
tives from ACS, DOP, and the Criminal Justice Coordinator’s Office (later 
renamed the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice). Judge Ronald Richter joined 
the negotiations after Mayor Bloomberg named him as the Commissioner of 
ACS in September 2011.
Everyone involved in designing the C2H process knew that the fist in imple-
menting the strategy would be transitioning youth already in custody from 
State to City responsibility. A significant number of agencies would have to 
collaborate to make transfers happen, including the courts, Probation, ACS, 
OCFS and the Department of Education.
Some officials argued, quite logically, that instead of transferring youths from 
State to City facilities, it would be more convenient to allow youth already 
in placement to remain until their release, and then to build out the new 
City-based system more slowly, as judges ordered newly adjudicated youth 
to City placements. Budget conscious officials, however, pointed out that this 
would mean running two systems concurrently for months or even years. The 
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costs involved in a dual system approach would be onerous — especially 
with State placement costs already rising rapidly. City and State officials 
eventually agreed that it would be impossible to finance both the old and new 
systems at the same time.
Once the negotiation team agreed to transfer already-placed youth to the 
City’s custody, the timing of transfers became a key discussion point. State 
leaders proposed a transition period of at least seven or eight months, as 
they believed the City would need time to create new structures for handling 
a large influx of youth. Neither ACS nor its contracted providers had much 
experience running programs for delinquent youth. City officials, however, 
pushed for a transition period of just four months because of budget 
concerns. Ultimately, the four-month timeline was adopted.
Some advocates argued that a longer timeframe would allow the City to 
create a better, more comprehensive system of services and supports. When 
advocates raised these concerns, however, City officials resisted. They argued 
that having an extended dialogue might prevent C2H from happening 
altogether. Several State officials concurred, telling researchers after the fact 
that if the initiative had been slowed down to allow for a more deliberate 
process, it was likely that State leaders would have balked at the scope of the 
reforms.
Agency officials also debated the levels of residential care that should be 
included in C2H reforms. State and City officials agreed that the State should 
continue to manage the most serious offenders — i.e. youth placed in the 
OCFS-designated level, “secure placement.” They were never considered 
for transfer. Officials debated, however, whether to include both of the next 
two categories: “non-secure” and “limited-secure” placements. Eventually, 
the negotiation team decided to include both levels. Youth in non-secure 
placements would be transferred to City programs first. One year later, 
according to the original plan, youth in limited-secure residential placements 
would be moved to City facilities. Nobody at the time predicted that it would 
actually take more than two years to change placement practices for the 
limited-secure population.
Some officials involved in the negotiations for C2H remained concerned 
about how family court judges in New York City would react. When the 
reforms were launched, what would happen if judges did not trust the 
new approach? If courts no longer had ready access the State’s non-secure 
placements, would judges begin to send even more youth to limited-secure 
facilities? Would they try to use City detention beds as a placement resource? 
Everyone worried about unintended consequences.
It’s Always Partly About the Money
Funding was a constant concern. The C2H initiative posed financial risks 
for both the City and the State. Officials from State agencies worried that 
most economic resources for youth placements were being shifted to the 
 Vincent Schiraldi (2012)
 “Everybody was in that room.”
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City. What if,  at some future time a larger number of youth were sent for 
placement at the most secure level? Would the State have enough resources 
to manage the entire population? City officials were equally concerned. What 
if the shift of resources from the State did not generate enough funding to 
create a truly effective residential system for City youth? Were they taking on 
too much?
The State wanted to fund City operations with a C2H block grant that would 
cover half of all placement costs. State agencies calculated the total costs for 
an intensive system of care for every City youth projected to require services, 
including drug and alcohol treatments, mental health care and educational 
supports. City leaders worried about the State’s block grant approach. What 
if the amount of the block grant remained flat and did not provide additional 
funds if and when demand for placement resources increased? State officials 
believed that a block grant approach was better than an open-ended funding 
stream that could create incentives for placement.
Linda Gibbs and Elizabeth Glazer were instrumental in making the numbers 
work for both parties. Eventually, both sides agreed to include a caveat in the 
legislation that provided for adjustment of the block grant formula if future 
changes in the legitimate demand for placement resources exceeded supply. 
The compromise involved using probation intake numbers to calculate 
changes in C2H allocations.
Designing a New System
State and City officials sometimes had different visions for how the new youth 
justice system should begin working with the Close to Home population 
in New York City. State officials were concerned about the inexperience 
of ACS — the agency in charge of new programs and facilities — and the 
ACS-affiliated providers that would have to serve a new type of client. 
Prior to the 2010 merger of ACS with the former New York City Department 
of Juvenile Justice, ACS was a child welfare and family services agency. 
Providers working under contract to ACS were accustomed to overseeing 
services and placements for neglected and abused children. When those 
agencies assumed responsibility for delinquent youth under C2H, they would 
face a new set of challenges. They would need to emphasize community safety 
and accountability in addition to youth development and family support.
City officials argued that many of the organizations involved in the C2H 
expansion were already part of the “alternatives to detention” system and 
ACS had been managing that system successfully for more than a year. In 
addition, they pointed out, their existing provider organizations had few 
incidences of youth absconding from facilities and they were obtaining 
positive outcomes, according to ACS data. The City believed that the existing 
community of ACS providers would be able to serve C2H youth safely and 
effectively.
 Gabrielle Horowitz-Prisco (2013)
 It’s “not just about moving kids.”
click to watch
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City and State officials needed to agree on the particular service models that 
ACS providers would follow in working with youth. All parties agreed that 
the system should be rooted in evidence-based models whenever possible, 
but plans were less firm for the considerable number of young offenders 
for whom evidence-based models do not often exist (i.e. youth with some 
delinquent history, but without alcohol and drug addictions, mental health 
disorders, or social and emotional pathologies). In other words, what were 
the service models for the run-of-the-mill, justice-involved youth without 
serious deficits? During an interview with one high-ranking City official, 
the research team asked about the service plan for these youth. The official 
answered, “They aren’t in the system.” Yet, service providers would point out 
that these exist, and they are the very youth who are often ill-served by justice 
systems that pathologize disadvantaged and impoverished communities.
Officials reviewed the most well-known youth justice approaches, including 
the Boys Town model, the Missouri model and the Sanctuary model. They 
eventually decided to establish flexible standards for providers to select 
whatever models best fit their needs. Some officials interviewed for this study 
noted that discussions about service models occasionally lacked cohesion. 
The majority of officials and providers agreed that juvenile interventions 
cannot be one-size-fits-all, but unless they had an evidence-based model at 
the ready, the agency partners did not always know where to turn.
Legislation
The law-making process used to launch Close to Home was somewhat 
unusual. In most executive initiatives, the Governor’s office may draft a 
general proposal without involving too many outsiders. The legislative 
process then follows, involving a range of different groups and constituencies. 
In other words, the final proposal is adapted through legislative negotiations. 
For Close to Home, the City and State agreed upon many details before the 
proposal was even presented to the legislature. When the bill did go to the 
legislature, there appeared to be little need for additional discussion. The 
details that traditionally delay the process had already been worked out.
Advocates still played an important role during legislative negotiations. 
Organizations such as the Correctional Association of New York and the 
Children’s Defense Fund analyzed early versions of the legislation and found 
that it did not include sufficient provisions for community engagement and 
oversight. Later, the State and City hosted a series of public hearings and 
these issues were addressed. 
Advocacy organizations worried that C2H was largely focused on placement, 
and they believed that any form of residential care introduces the risk of 
abuse. The advocates wanted to dispel the notion that youth would be 
inherently less likely to be abused in smaller facilities. While small facilities 
were better on balance, youth in placement would not be safer just because 
they were closer to home and in smaller facilities run by the City rather than 
the State. With the strong support of advocates, the Close to Home legislation 
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eventually gave the State (i.e. OCFS) continuing responsibility for oversight. 
City youth would be placed with City agencies, but the State would continue to 
review their safety and well-being.
The advocates did not achieve one of their most important goals. They asked 
the State to require City agencies to release regular performance measures 
about youth services. The final legislation required the City and State to 
provide data about performance outcomes to the State Senate and Assembly, 
but it did not include a mandate for public transparency.
The lack of meaningful community and family engagement in the development 
of C2H was always a major concern for advocates. The legislation merely 
required the City to respond in writing to public comments about the plans for 
Close to Home. The City was required to explain any public recommendations 
they chose to disregard, and the reasons behind the decision, but the advocacy 
organizations believed that families and communities should have been 
involved in the crafting of C2H. On the other hand, the advocates were able to 
increase the number of community hearings held throughout New York City, 
and they played an important role in translating the legal language of Close to 
Home to something understandable for the larger community.
Governor Cuomo signed Close to Home into law on March 30, 2012. The pre-
legislative work performed by the City and State partners proved very helpful 
when the Governor’s office finally released the legislation. It seemed futile for 
any institution to argue against Close to Home when Governor Cuomo and 
Mayor Bloomberg had both signed off on it.
The Non-Residential Component
The C2H initiative included two key components: 1) local placement facilities 
for low and medium-risk youth; and 2) an expanded continuum of commu-
nity-based alternatives. The placement component received the most attention 
during public debate and virtually all of the new funds transferred from the 
State to the City were for out-of-home placements. The availability of non-
residential alternatives, however, was critical to the overall effectiveness of 
C2H. After a youth is adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent, the Department of 
Probation recommends a disposition to the court. With the launch of Close to 
Home, DOP needed more dispositional options.
The DOP oversees youth sent to the City’s “alternative-to-placement” programs 
(ATPs). Probation’s mission includes the provision of services for these youth, 
including education, employment, health services, family engagement and 
civic participation. In the years leading up to C2H, the agency had already 
increased the number of community-based programs that were available for 
low and medium-risk young offenders. As part of C2H, it needed to expand the 
full continuum of services and to create a new set of comprehensive programs.
The Department of Probation also redesigned its decision-making process. 
Before C2H, DOP based its disposition recommendations on a risk assessment 
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tool that emphasized treatment needs. As a result, placements were often 
recommended for youth who had committed low-level offenses but were 
considered high risk for re-arrest due to treatment needs. To correct that 
situation, the C2H legislation mandated that DOP create a new pre-disposi-
tional risk protocol (with OCFS approval).
After reviews of several draft instruments, OCFS approved the agency’s new 
Structured Decision Making (SDM) matrix (Figure 3). The matrix combines 
information about a young person’s re-offense risk level (measured by the 
Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory, or YLS-CMI) along with 
the seriousness of the most recent offense. This information is used to shape 
DOP’s disposition recommendation. Dispositions range from dismissal to 
out-of-home placement. Probation officers may also recommend options that 
are more or less restrictive than what the matrix provides (i.e. “over-rides” or 
“under-rides”).
With the introduction of the SDM matrix, treatment needs would no longer 
drive dispositional decision-making, but they would still be considered during 
post-disposition service planning. Youth with high treatment needs but low 
risk profiles would be referred to community services instead of going under 
formal supervision or being placed. The SDM provided better information 
about dispositional recommendations and about the level of supervision each 
youth should receive. It also increased consistency across courtrooms and 
helped to avoid racial and gender bias (NYC Department of Probation 2012).
Probation officials told researchers that the SDM was also intended to prevent 
the “net-widening” effect that can occur when a new array of services becomes 
available for young offenders. In other words, low-risk youth who would 
have been handled less strictly before the availability of the new alternatives 
are sometimes moved into more restrictive dispositions simply because new 
programs exist.
DOP officials were determined to prevent net-widening. Even the new alterna-
tives to placement were not to be available for low-risk youth. Agency leaders 
hoped that the SDM would restrict access to the new programs and reserve 
them for youth with serious charges or youth with moderate arrest charges and 
The rhetoric and the promise [of Close to Home] was about moving kids into 
community-based services as much as possible because that gets better outcomes. 
The research shows that it reduces recidivism and it saves taxpayers an incredible 
amount of money because it’s $20,000 a year versus $266,000.
— Gabrielle Horowitz-Prisco, 2013
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a high likelihood of re-arrest. The Department expected that the new system 
would lead to an increase in the number of adjournments and conditional 
discharge recommendations for low risk youth and an increase in ATP recom-
mendations for higher severity offenses. They believed the new system would 
enable placement recommendations overall to go down, especially for low-level 
offenders.
The probation department modified the process it used to make disposition 
recommendations as well (Figure 4). Before January 2013, judges could send 
a youth to an ATP only after DOP first recommended placement. This recom-
mendation triggered an Exploration of Placement (EOP) process in which 
DOP sent a youth’s information to placement and ATP providers. After this 
process, the judge would then decide whether to place the youth at a state 
facility or to send him/her to an ATP. The rationale behind requiring the EOP 
was to prevent the overuse of the most expensive alternatives to placement. 
The process was designed to encourage judges to send only youth who really 
needed such services to the ATPs, but it may have created incentives for 
placement.
Under C2H and the new SDM matrix, Probation would no longer have to 
recommend placement in order for a youth to gain access to placement alter-
natives. The Probation officer could directly recommend an ATP, followed 
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might best address that youth’s particular needs. When DOP recommended 
placement, the court directly managed the case. If the court decided that 
a youth should be placed at a non-secure site, ACS would conduct an 
assessment to decide the most appropriate provider for that individual 
youth. State officials at OCFS, however, would continue to manage placement 
decisions for youth referred to limited-secure and secure placements — at 
least until limited-secure placements were included in the C2H reforms and 
transferred to City responsibility (NYC Department of Probation 2012).
Under the C2H reforms, the City increased the number and diversity of 
community programs for youth. Judges could assign delinquents to 
varying levels of supervision and services without relying on residential 
placement. The decision-making process allocated cases to one of three-
levels of supervision, according to the intensity of contact required for each 
youth and the recommended duration of the program (usually from one 
to two years). The level of supervision could be adjusted to fit each youth’s 
progress. Levels 1 and 2 were designed to last up to one year, while youth on 
Level 3 would be under DOP supervision between one and two years. Level 3 
was also known as the Enhanced Supervision Program (ESP). Probation 
officers would conduct individual and group work with youth on ESP and 
involve the family more extensively in the process (ACS 2013a). Caseloads 
were balanced so that probation officers working with higher-risk/severity 
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DOP instituted three new alternatives to placement that differed in intensity 
and the extent of supervision. The goal was to have a fair distribution of 
program slots available for youth in all NYC boroughs and to provide youth 
with whatever approach best met their needs. The highest level of intensity 
in an alternative program would be provided by Every Child Has an 
Opportunity to Excel and Succeed (ECHOES). It was designed to 
last 12 months and would be based on life coaching and restorative justice 
principles. Eligible youth would work with probation officers and staff at 
community-based organizations five times a week to develop educational and 
personal skills to achieve literacy, become employed, and to maintain positive 
relationships (NYC Department of Probation 2012).
The Advocate, Intervene, Mentor program (or, AIM) was to provide 
intensive mentoring and advocacy for youth who were severely disconnected 
from their families and communities. The concept of AIM was to provide an 
advocate/mentor who would guide the youth and his/her family towards the 
community services and resources they needed to succeed. Each mentor had 
a caseload of no more than four youths and families, and they would work 
with each client from 7 to 30 hours per week, depending on the youth and 
family’s need.
Pathways to Excellence, Achievement and Knowledge (or, PEAK) 
would be a six-month intervention that combined educational, behavior 
modification and therapeutic elements into a full-day curriculum. AIM and 
PEAK were to last six months, followed by Level 3 probation after a tran-
sitional phase prior to completion of the programs (NYC Department of 
Probation 2012).  The DOP launched AIM and ECHOES in the summer of 
2012, with PEAK opening the following year.
These new programs were designed to build on the previous ATP continuum, 
which included the Juvenile Justice Initiative (JJI) and Esperanza. JJI 
would continue, whereas DOP planned to shift Esperanza over for Juvenile 
Offenders and Youth Offenders (i.e., not “delinquents” under New York State 
parlance). By the time Close to Home was launched, the City was planning to 
increase the array of ATP programs by 65 slots with further adjustments as 
necessary (ACS 2013a).
Implementation
The C2H initiative represented a major shift in organizational culture for 
public youth justice agencies and private providers. Implementing the 
reforms required many decisions and consensus was not always easy to 
achieve. More than two years into the initiative, officials still differed in their 
views of Close to Home. Some strongly supported it, but others remained 
concerned about its effectiveness and long-term sustainability.
 Nina Aledort (2013)
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State officials were sometimes skeptical about the decision to expand ACS’s 
child welfare mission to include work with young offenders. City officials 
acknowledged that ACS lacked experience in the juvenile justice arena at first, 
but they were confident that staff members were developing the necessary 
expertise. In some ways, ACS was well positioned to assume responsibility for 
the expanded youth justice placements. Caseworkers experienced in foster care 
and group home placements might be especially capable of recommending 
the right mix of placements and services for individual youth, whether they 
required juvenile justice or child welfare services.
For OCFS, Close to Home was a departure from business as usual. The 
agency operated a largely institution-based system for decades, and those 
facilities were important employers in the local economies of several upstate 
communities. The C2H initiative would likely mean the loss of OCFS jobs. It 
was no small task for OCFS leadership to manage the associated stress and 
conflict. OCFS held a series of negotiations with unions to explain the new 
policies and to seek their buy-in and support. Although agency officials worked 
hard to retain employees and move them into different positions, layoffs were 
unavoidable. State officials told researchers that more than 1,200 positions 
were lost after OCFS began to downsize facilities in 2007. The C2H initiative 
would likely accelerate the process.
When judged by the stated goals of the C2H initiative, however, it was clear 
that the reforms were working. During the first year of implementation, youth 
from New York City who once would have been sent hours away to upstate 
New York placements were now staying in the City and staying in contact 
with their families, neighborhoods, and schools. The youth justice system was 
changing, at least for the young people who otherwise would have been in 
OCFS’s non-secure placements.
Phase 1 
Phase 1 of C2H (the transfer of youth in “non-secure placements”) began 
a few months after the enabling C2H legislation passed in 2012. Some 
new educational and service-delivery programs were open in four months. 
Transfers of placements began within six to seven months.
Everyone involved in C2H was aware that the shift in placements occurred 
during a time of generally declining youth crime and a falling rate of placement 
overall. Among New York City youth, placements were falling for at least 
a decade by the time C2H was launched. Between 2006 and early 2014, the 
total number of New York City youth in some form of placement due to law 
violations dropped from nearly 1,400 at any given time to slightly more than 
400 (Figure 5).
Just before the launch of C2H, New York City had dozens of youth in State-run 
non-secure facilities. Once those placements began to be transferred to the 
City’s responsibility, the change process moved very quickly. Phase 1 resulted 
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in 52 new City-based placements within the first month. By the end of 2012, 
the non-secure facility population had climbed to 157, and the total population 
reached a peak of 213 four months later in April 2013 (Figure 6).
The relatively fast start of transfers did not mean that the entire process 
would go smoothly. City officials admitted to researchers that they were 
often frustrated by how long it took contractors to prepare new facilities and 
programs. Providers often felt rushed. Some had never operated a youth justice 
facility before, and they had just four months to hire qualified staff and to open 
up new program sites. The youth in these placements had complex service 
needs, often including serious trauma. The City planned to build its array of 
new services and placements around principles from the “Missouri Model,” 
and most of the new providers had insufficient experience with that approach. 
Naturally, providers were not always able to open as quickly as they had hoped.
Handling the mix of case types in the new system introduced other complexi-
ties. Some providers were unprepared to serve females. Bed capacity became 
an issue immediately as City facilities received more girls than anticipated 
during the early discussions about C2H. Eventually, ACS had to change the 
Source:  
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designation of some programs from male to female in order to compensate for 
the miscalculation. It took longer than expected to build the gender-specific 
programming required to serve female offenders with mental health treatment 
needs and histories of trauma.
Even when the new agencies were ready to accept them, the process for 
completing transfers of custody to the City posed other challenges. The C2H 
legislation required that OCFS review each case individually to determine who 
was eligible for transfer. The agency could not simply transfer an entire class of 
youth. Separate petitions and court proceedings were required, and the process 
took longer than expected. In order to expedite it, attorneys for many juveniles 
agreed to waive their client’s right to attend every court appearance. Some 
judges opposed this shortcut, however, and their cases involved full hearings 
on each petition.
Confidentiality and information sharing further complicated and slowed 
the transfer process. To provide youth with an appropriate mix of services, 
the State required OCFS to inform the City’s ACS about the service needs of 
each youth in some detail. First, however, OCFS had to obtain information 
releases and consents from parents and families. Obtaining these releases was 
time consuming and it slowed down the process of matching each youth with 
appropriate programs and facilities.
Despite the complications and delays, City officials interviewed for this study 
were encouraged by the performance of the ACS contractors. Once the early 
obstacles were overcome, it was clear that youth from New York City were 
gaining access to a broader array of services and supports. The expanded 
investments in localized services appeared to be paying off for youth and 
families.
Some glitches were unexpected. Delays in the opening of new placement 
facilities forced state-level providers to transfer many youth from OCFS 
residential care directly to City aftercare services rather than first sending 
them to residential care in the City. This pathway was not anticipated 
during the initial planning of C2H. Local providers were not always ready to 
provide proper supervision for youth in aftercare status, and State officials 
believed that ACS did not have sufficient staff to oversee the sudden increase 
in aftercare youth. In the first months of C2H, according to OCFS records, it 
took an average of 21 days to connect a newly released youth to City-sponsored 
aftercare services. The delays triggered a spike in violations (sanctions for 
youth who violated the terms and conditions of aftercare) and some youth 
were returned to custody as a result.
Safety and security turned out to be challenging in the early days of C2H. The 
programs contracted to serve youthful offenders during the first year of C2H 
experienced an unexpected number of AWOLs (“away without leave” or youth 
who leave a program site without permission). By mid-August 2013, there had 
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been 662 AWOL incidents lasting at least 24 hours. After the first year, AWOL 
incidents declined steadily, and by the end of 2013 the AWOL level in City 
facilities was below the State average. The early AWOLs, however, suggested 
that at least some of the City’s new facilities may have been rushed into service 
before they were fully prepared. 
Other delays occurred because new providers had difficulty obtaining the 
appropriate licensure. All told, the transfer process took five months longer 
than expected. Despite everyone’s best intentions, there were two youth justice 
systems working at the same time during the initial months of implementation 
— the old State system managed entirely by OCFS and the newly designed City 
system authorized by the Close to Home legislation. 
The number of youth actually transferred from State placements was only 
half the original estimate. About 300 youth from New York City were housed 
in non-secure State facilities when C2H was launched, but due to implemen-
tation delays, half of them completed their placements in upstate facilities. 
Once all non-secure placements had been moved to City programs, State and 
City officials agreed that the new arrangements were operating successfully. 
Eventually, Phase 1 changed how New York City responded to low-risk juvenile 
offenders. All newly adjudicated cases disposed to non-secure placement were 
placed with the City’s new system.
Ongoing Coordination
OCFS approved and continued to oversee the plan that ACS developed for 
managing the new localized placement system. ACS and OCFS wanted to 
ensure that all service sectors were well-coordinated before moving into 
Phase 2 of C2H. One of the most critical components was education. The 
NYC Department of Education’s District 79 Superintendent, Tim Lisante, 
was engaged early in the planning process. District 79’s Passages Academy 
provided educational services to most NSP youth with 11 sites located 
throughout the City. These sites also served non-secure detention (NSD) youth, 
but NSD and NSP youth were educated in separate classrooms. Two providers 
operated their own schools (ACS 2013b).
Delays in implementation affected educational goals as well as treatment 
goals. In the initial plan for C2H, officials intended to transfer as many youth 
as possible in September 2012 in order to avoid interrupting their schooling 
in the middle of an academic year. However, transfers were just beginning in 
September and continued through the Fall, which complicated the transition 
process for many youth.
Establishing effective student discipline strategies for C2H youth in the school 
setting was another immediate challenge. The two City schools designated 
for the non-secure placement population served the City’s juvenile detention 
system as well. Schools were not fully prepared for the integration of both 
populations.
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Officials were generally pleased with the educational component once the early 
bugs were worked out. Unlike the pre-C2H system, youth placed in care under 
C2H remained in the City’s Department of Education system without interrup-
tion and credits earned during placement counted toward their educational 
record when they returned to the community. Previously, the credits that 
youth earned during State placements were not easily transferred because 
the State and the City used different educational credit systems. When youth 
were released and returned to City schools, each school Principal had the legal 
authority to deny the transfer of credits. Under the new system, all schools 
serving youth during placement were licensed and accredited by the City.
Other measures were implemented to ensure continuity between facility-based 
schools and community schools, including an online education and reentry 
planning tool called “Plan to Succeed NYC.” Students, families, and community 
schools could access the system for planning and simple communication. The 
City school system also created a new counselor position to assist families and 
to prepare youth for their return to a community school after placement.
These practices were a dramatic improvement compared with the previous 
era when justice-involved youth were routinely denied access to their former 
schools after placement. After the launch of C2H Phase 1, the City Department 
of Education reported a significant spike in credits earned by placed youth, 
as well as higher percentages of youth taking and passing the State Regents 
exams.
Disciplinary Practices
The planning process included a focus on disciplinary protocols, as these 
varied widely across the City’s youth facilities and led to inconsistent practices 
and confusion for youth who moved between the school setting and the 
residential setting. Officials from the City’s Department of Education reported 
that behavioral incidents in the residential setting often carried over into 
the classroom, sometimes leading to violent clashes between students. New 
protocols had to be created, and educational staff were forced to improvise 
until the new procedures were put in place. The lack of advance planning was 
described by some officials as detrimental to the early success of C2H. The 
Department of Education reported increasing rates of fights and runaways 
during the 2012-2013 school year. Residential providers and educators had to 
work quickly to solve a new set of problems.
Youth advocates had been concerned about disciplinary practices given 
OCFS’ track record and ACS’ own history of problematic practices in the 
City’s detention facilities. Data from ACS’ own monitoring efforts had shown 
that during the fourth quarter of FY 2012 and the first quarter of FY 2013 
combined, over 1,500 physical or mechanical restraints of children occurred 
with 125 reported injuries to children. In the same period, two ACS-run 
detention facilities had over 150 instances of room isolation.
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
32STAYING CONNECTED Keeping Justice-Involved Youth “Close to Home” in New York City
For Phase 1 of Close to Home, ACS designed a set of discipline policies that 
providers were required to follow. To prevent abusive restraint practices, 
ACS required each NSP provider to adopt a positive behavioral management 
approach like the Safe Crisis Management System (SCM) – which focuses on 
de-escalating crisis situations. When youth presented acute physical behavior 
– i.e. risk of physical injury, danger to the facility, or intent to escape — ASC 
required providers to follow the SCM to deal with the behavior while avoiding 
the use of force and physical restraint. The use of room isolation was only 
permitted in NSP facilities that housed 13 or more youth and only after other 
de-escalation measures were ineffective. ACS also crafted a specific set of 
procedures that providers were required to follow after successful escapes 
(ACS 2012; 2013a).
Reentry and Aftercare 
The end of placement and a youth’s return to the community are always 
critical moments for justice systems. During C2H implementation, ACS made 
reentry planning a high priority. Planning for each youth’s transition to the 
community was to begin while the youth was still placed. ACS specialists and 
placement staff developed a specific plan for every youth and worked closely 
with the family in order to address any potential difficulties that were likely 
to occur during the transition phase.
In the early stages of C2H, ACS relied on its existing providers for aftercare 
services. Many youth returning from non-secure placements received 
services from the Juvenile Justice Initiative’s (JJI) intensive aftercare 
program — a four-month program based on Functional Family Therapy. As 
C2H expanded, ACS planned to evolve its aftercare practices and to replace 
the JJI model with a new approach tailored for Close to Home. The goal was 
for local community-based organizations to play a central role in reentry and 
continuing care and support by providing specialized services for youth, such 
as mentoring, recreation and tutoring (ACS 2012).
The design of an effective and well-serviced aftercare program for C2H youth 
was one of the main concerns of State officials during negotiations leading up 
to the launch of C2H. The State considered the City’s initial plans to be weak. 
State officials pushed for the creation of a more comprehensive approach for 
aftercare. Although the State later agreed that ACS had improved its aftercare 
services, the need for well-structured aftercare programs remained an area of 
concern for OCFS.
System Oversight
Long before C2H, youth advocates had been critical of the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms in New York’s residential placement system. 
Many factors, including the distance between the State facilities and New 
York City, prevented families and lawyers from properly monitoring the 
system’s behavior. With the development of C2H, ACS provided more support 
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for the independent Juvenile Justice Oversight Board, whose members were 
not ACS staff. Board members were empowered to visit facilities, to make 
recommendations for system performance, and to issue annual reports.
Existing accountability measures were still subject to criticism. Gabrielle 
Horowitz-Prisco, director of the Juvenile Justice Project at the Correctional 
Association of New York, questioned the independence and transpar-
ency of the Board. In testimony at a City Council hearing in January 2013, 
she pointed out the lack of clear oversight and cited the need for standard 
practices like unannounced visits to providers and confidential interviews 
with youth.
The C2H legislation included a series of external oversight mechanisms 
designed to ensure high quality execution of the plan. OCFS was designated 
to oversee the implementation of the initiative, ACS’ case management and 
aftercare, and the licensing and functioning of the providers. OCFS also 
created a Close to Home Oversight and System Improvement unit (CTHO) to 
monitor the new City-based residential system (ACS 2012). The oversight unit 
organized site visits with staff and youth in provider agencies. It also planned 
to interview youth’s family members to gain a more complete understanding 
of the complexity of the reintegration issues facing youth and their families. 
The CTHO provided technical assistance and support to providers regarding 
ACS policies and regulations, AWOL protocols, gender-specific programming, 
and transition planning. According to one OCFS official, the core mission of 
the OCFS oversight team was to maintain the momentum of the State’s own 
juvenile justice reform efforts and to remain involved in shaping the quality 
of the City system under Close to Home.
The C2H legislation granted the State a significant oversight role and allowed 
OCFS to require corrective action if the City was ever out of compliance with 
the approved process. If problems persist, OCFS was authorized to use fiscal 
penalties and, ultimately, to terminate ACS’ authority to operate the juvenile 
justice services specified under Close to Home. As a City agency, ACS was also 
overseen by the New York City Council and the City’s Public Advocates’ office. 
The Close to Home legislation did not require ACS to release performance 
measures to the public, but with support from the advocacy community the 
City Council passed legislation in June 2013 that mandated publication of 
key demographic data and incident reports on youth detained and placed in 
City-run facilities.
Support for Alternative Programs
Finally, many of the State and City officials involved in Close to Home 
believed that its success would rest largely on how well the youth justice 
system was able to expand and use alternatives to placement. The City’s 
Department of Probation, for instance, was deeply involved in developing and 
funding a wider array of alternative programs for young offenders.
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Within the first year of implementation, it was clear that resources had been 
shifted successfully to community alternatives and that judges were beginning 
to utilize the programs (Figure 7). The probation department reported that 
as of February 2014 the AIM and ECHOES programs were operating at near 
capacity.
The ECHOES program took some time to reach capacity, in part because 
the DOP sited the initial set of 70 program slots in Harlem and the program 
there struggled to recruit sufficient numbers of clients. Realizing that the 
ECHOES program may have been too large in the Harlem neighborhood, DOP 
reassessed the scale and location of ECHOES providers and reissued contracts, 
including a second site in Jamaica Queens. By early 2014, 90 percent of the 
ECHOES program slots were occupied. The Department’s goal was to maintain 
an occupancy rate of 80 to 90 percent and City officials expressed confidence 
that they could meet this goal.
City officials also focused on the community and recreational activities 
available for placed youth. When ACS recruited provider agencies to 
serve youth in placement, they preferred agencies that endorsed a youth 
development approach. For example, Children’s Village and SCO Family of 
Services were NSP providers with a long history of emphasizing positive youth 
development and community involvement. They worked to ensure that youth 
had ample opportunities to participate in service projects in the community, 
including activities like working in a food pantry or helping to support 
homeless families. Providers were also encouraged to integrate recreational 
activities and the arts into daily programming for youth.
By 2014, ACS had established partnerships and contracts with a variety of 
community-based and alternative youth programs (Sherman 2015). These 
programs included:
• Voices Unbroken — Writing based workshops to help young people build 
literacy skills. 
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• Healing Arts of Montefiore Medical Center — Convening artists and 
young people to design and paint murals and other artwork.
• High Five/Art Connection — Introducing youth in non-secure residential 
settings to the arts with visits to live theater and museums.
• Carnegie Hall — Connecting youth with professional musicians to 
compose, produce and perform their own music.
• New York City Mayor’s Office to Combat Domestic Violence — Working 
with young people in ACS programs to learn about the sources and effects 
of family and partner violence and its effects on relationships and health.
• Girl Scouts Council of Greater New York — Providing workshops on 
financial literacy, leadership development, career planning and college 
preparation.
• Yoga for Yoga — Offering weekly yoga sessions for youth in ACS 
programs.
• Row New York — Introducing youth to rowing and leveraging physical 
activity as support for academic success.
• exalt youth — Providing structured classes and individualized support 
related to work and labor market success, including paid internships. 
• Gender-Responsive Re-entry Assistance and Support Program — An 
evidence-informed re-entry program for young women transitioning 
from placement to the community.  
Phase 2 
Close to Home was designed to include a second phase affecting limited-
secure placements. Youth in LSP facilities were higher-risk offenders, 
although not as high risk as those in secure facilities. The original C2H 
plan predicted that LSP youth would be moved to City-operated programs 
in Spring 2013, which was eventually postponed to Fall 2013 (ACS 2013b). 
By the end of 2014, implementation had been postponed again and was 
scheduled for March 2015. During the extra year of planning, OCFS and 
ACS worked together to ensure that the City’s new LSP programs were ready 
before the launch of Phase 2.
According to ACS officials, a key reason for postponing Phase 2 was the 
difficulty the agency encountered in recruiting providers with appropriate 
resources and program space. Both ACS and OCFS agreed that it was better to 
delay the launch of Phase 2 rather than to rush a deadline that could result in 
opening programs with inadequate resources for youth. Selecting providers 
and determining the distribution of program slots were major decisions for 
ACS. In Phase 1, the agency relied on a decision-making process that matched 
individual youth with the most appropriate provider based on need. An ACS 
intake and assessment team gathered information from a variety of sources 
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to learn about each youth and family. The team then accounted for any special 
needs of the youth and his/her educational abilities and included suitable 
provisions in the service plan.
For ACS officials, it was clear that the process for placing youth in LSP facilities 
would be at least as complicated. ACS worked with the Vera Institute of Justice 
to develop a classification tool designed to integrate information about youth 
behavior during past placements with other predictive information. The tool 
was still in development in 2014 and not yet fully implemented, but the agency 
hoped that it would supplement ACS’ other assessments in helping to make 
final placement determinations. Such a tool would be particularly helpful in 
instances when the family court ordered placement for a youth, but requested 
further input from ACS (ACS 2012; 2013a).
The government officials and private practitioners interviewed for this study 
were cautiously optimistic about the launch of Phase 2. Both the State and City 
embraced the vision of a youth justice system in which placements would be 
used sparingly and family members would play a key role in the design and 
follow-up of treatment plans. Phase 2 would be another significant shift in 
policy and practice and everyone involved was anxious to see it begin.
Outcomes
More than two years after the launch of Close to Home, the obvious question is, 
“did it work?” The evidence is clear that the initiative was effective in changing 
the youth justice system in New York City (Figure 8). When the outcomes of 
the C2H initiative are judged by placement patterns, the available data show 
that placement trends changed and they changed as intended. In December 
2011, the year before the launch, 544 juvenile delinquents from New York City 
were in some form of out-of-home placement due to law violations. Of these, 
204 were in private residential facilities and 340 were in State-run facilities, 
including 123 in secure placements, 130 in limited-secure placements, and 87 
in non-secure placements.
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Of course, the number of placements from New York City was falling. The 
overall volume of delinquency placements declined after the launch of C2H 
and for the next two years. Overall, placements dropped to 494 in 2012 and 
428 in 2013. By April 2014 the total number of New York City juveniles in 
placement was 415.
The decline in placements cannot be attributed to the C2H initiative because 
the trend existed before C2H and did not accelerate appreciably under C2H. 
The change in the configuration of placements, on the other hand, may be 
attributed to C2H. The number of youth in State-run non-secure facilities 
plummeted as intended, from 87 placed youth in 2011 to 9 youth in 2014.
As the City assumed responsibility for non-secure placements, those low-risk 
youth were no longer placed in State facilities. Instead they were placed with 
City programs administered by the Administration for Children’s Services. 
The ACS non-secure programs were serving 157 youth by December of 2012 
and more than 200 youth at a time for the next two years.
Before the launch of C2H, advocates had worried that restricting New York 
City’s access to State-operated non-secure facilities would cause more youth 
to be reclassified as limited secure and this would lead to an expansion of 
those placements. This did not happen. The number of New York City youth 
placed in the State’s limited-secure facilities continued to fall after C2H. In 
2014, there were just 65 New York City youth in limited-secure placements — 
half the number in those placements in 2011.
Some other dire predictions about Close to Home also failed to come true. 
There were concerns among youth advocates, and even some officials within 
the youth justice system, that the expansion of programs and placements 
at the City level would lead to an overall expansion of the system. As police 
and courts learned about the greater resources available at the local level, 
so goes the argument, the perceived negative consequences of taking action 
against a youth would be lessened. Since there would be less of a chance that 
a particular youth would end up hundreds of miles away in a State-operated 
juvenile facility, the decision to arrest and to charge would be easier to make.
However, this did not happen (Figure 9). According to data from the Division 
of Criminal Justice Services, juvenile arrests (JD and JO) in New York City 
actually dropped more after C2H compared with the rest of the State. In the 
years just before C2H, arrests were declining in the City and State, but the 
relative decline was smaller in New York City (–4% between 2009 and 2011 
in New York City versus –18% in the rest of the State). After the beginning of 
Close to Home, the situation was reversed. Arrests in New York City fell more 
(–39%) than in other areas of the State (–24%).
A different pattern was evident in the number of delinquency petitions 
filed in family courts across New York, but there was still no evidence 
that C2H increased the volume of court petitions (Figure 10). Before the 
 Laurence Busching (2013)
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implementation of C2H, the number of delinquency petitions in New York City 
courts declined somewhat more than did petitions outside of the City (–22% 
versus –17% between 2009 and 2011). After C2H began in 2012, the gap 
closed. The number of delinquency petitions fell 19 percent in both City courts 
and courts in other areas of the State.
The reversal pattern seen in arrests was also apparent in the number of intakes 
to probation departments before and after Close to Home (Figure 11). Juvenile 
delinquency probation intakes actually declined more in New York City than 
the rest of the state after the implementation of Close to Home. In the two 
years just before C2H, intakes dropped two percent in New York City, but fell 
18 percent in the rest of the State. After the beginning of Close to Home, the 
decrease in intakes by New York City probation (–41%) was three times the 
size of other New York communities (–12%).
Another unintended consequence that did not occur was the potential shift 
toward using detention beds. Restricting out-of-home placements could 
have led to greater demand for detention bed space in the City. In principle, 
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high-risk youth. In other words, detention beds and out-of-home placement 
slots are not supposed to be inter-changeable. When a court system cannot 
access placements in sufficient numbers, however, judges could have started to 
draw upon available detention beds as a form of substitute placement.
In fact, however, the launch of C2H was associated with an even larger decline 
in detention in New York City (Figure 12). Before C2H, the number of juvenile 
detention admissions in New York City declined at a pace that was slightly 
greater than the rest of New York State. Between 2009 and 2011, detention 
admissions in New York City fell 17 percent while admissions in other areas 
of New York State dipped 15 percent. After C2H, admissions in New York City 
decreased even more relative to the rest of the state (–30% versus –21%).
The same pattern was seen in average daily detention population (Figure 13). 
Before C2H, the detention population in New York City fell slightly more than 
the rest of the state (–21% compared with –20%). After the launch of C2H, the 
decline in the City’s detention populations outpaced that of the rest of the state 
(–22% versus –15%).
The available data suggest that New York’s Close to Home initiative succeeded 
in nearly eliminating placements of New York City youth in State non-secure 
facilities within the first year. The initiative also expanded the use of alternative 
placements and non-residential programs for youth who may have otherwise 
been placed in State facilities. Critics of the Close to Home reform once warned 
that making these changes could widen the net of justice intervention and 
even increase the use of placement and detention space at the local level, but 
these predictions did not materialize. It will take several more years before 
additional research will be able to assess whether Close to Home protected the 
public safety and accomplished other  important goals related to treatment and 
behavior change among young offenders. In the first two years of the initiative, 
however, the effort was implemented as promised and it succeeded in meeting 
its stated goals without unanticipated negative consequences.
Source: Juvenile Justice 
Profiles. New York State 
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Conclusions
All of the officials and practitioners interviewed for this study believed the 
Close to Home initiative improved the youth justice system in New York. Most 
interviewees believed that Phase 2 would go even further and perhaps create a 
truly rehabilitative approach to youth justice. In everyone’s opinion, New York 
was moving in the right direction.
The first phase of Close to Home clearly helped those youth who were once 
held in the State’s remote, non-secure facilities. Beginning in 2012, those 
youth were being served in community-based programs closer to their own 
neighborhoods. Even those who were still in residential placements had 
more opportunities for family visits and they were able to maintain positive 
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Close to Home also improved educational supports for justice-involved 
youth. School officials in New York City reported that the youth affected 
by C2H were taking and passing their Regents Exams at higher rates than 
before, and they were more often returning to their neighborhood schools 
following placement. According to one official: “they don’t leave the NYC 
[school] system when they get placed now, and this continuity is critical to 
helping them succeed when they get home.”
The stronger emphasis on contract oversight under Close to Home was also 
an improvement over the pre-C2H era. Providers told researchers that both 
ACS and OCFS played an active oversight role during the first phase of the 
C2H initiative. ACS and OCFS staff members were visiting facilities more 
often and were more familiar with program staff and clients.
As the City and State move into Phase 2 of C2H in 2015, a couple of key 
questions should be asked. Namely, what strategies were effective in 
advancing the C2H agenda, and what mistakes should be avoided? Several 
answers emerged during interviews for this report:
• Providers need time to prepare for new clients and new caseloads. The 
planning process for Close to Home should allow for reasonable start-up 
time, and the City and State should collaborate to support the costs of 
contractors during the start-up phase.
• More effort should be made to minimize the number of youth who are 
transferred from one setting to another in the midst of a residential stay. 
New placement facilities should grow with new admissions rather than 
transferring youth from old facilities. 
• Building high-quality programs and placements is essential, but it is 
also important to build in controls over access to those programs and 
placements. Net-widening is an ever-present risk.
• The C2H initiative benefitted from the effective division of labor 
between City and State officials — i.e. the City assumed primary respon-
sibility for managing and contracting for programs while the State 
provided oversight and regulatory review. 
• Residential work in the youth justice system is difficult and challenging. 
Youth justice systems must recruit staff carefully and provide employees 
with ongoing training and professional development to ensure quality 
of care and to minimize turnover. 
• While youth justice agencies should rely on evidence-based or evidence-
informed service models whenever possible, such models do not exist 
for every youth and family factor that leads to crime and delinquency. 
Youth justice systems should include other interventions suggested by 
adolescent development science and preventive principles (e.g., job 
supports, educational mentoring, participation in the arts, sports and 
physical activity, and an array of other skill-based interventions).
 Panel Discussion (2014)
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As a reform strategy, Close to Home is not yet complete. During interviews 
for this study, agency officials from both the City and the State agreed with 
advocates that more investments were needed in community-based, non-
residential alternatives. They also agreed that placement decisions would 
require ongoing scrutiny — even after the launch of Phase 2. 
The officials most involved in C2H were clear that recent reforms were not 
simply about moving placements and programs from one agency to another. 
Transferring placements from OCFS to ACS would accomplish nothing 
unless the quality of youth justice improved. As Commissioner Gladys 
Carrión stated in 2014: “Either one of us [ACS or OCFS] is quite capable of 
running a really poor system. It’s not about who runs it.” 
Close to Home was also not a privatization initiative. If the principal 
outcome of C2H was simply that private agencies began to play a larger role 
in youth justice, the initiative should not be considered a success. 
Finally, while the officials interviewed for this study sometimes differed 
about the importance of budgetary concerns in the long-term, none believed 
the success of C2H should be judged simply in terms of short-term costs. 
In their view, the goal of Close to Home was to build a more effective youth 
justice system that provides high-quality services for youth and families in 
order to ensure safer communities.
Perhaps in a few years, as more outcome data become available, New 
Yorkers will learn that the Close to Home initiative brought real and lasting 
benefits to justice-involved and their communities. As of now, however, 
while nobody is ready to call the initiative a complete success, the general 
consensus is that Close to Home is a promising reform that has already 
improved the quality of youth justice in New York City and New York State.
www.JohnJayREC.nyc
43STAYING CONNECTED Keeping Justice-Involved Youth “Close to Home” in New York City
References
ACS (2012). Plan for Non-Secure Placement. New York, 
NY: NYC Administration for Children’s Services.
ACS (2013a). New York City Administration for 
Children’s Services Close to Home: Draft Plan 
for Limited Secure Placement. New York, NY: NYC 
Administration for Children’s Services.
ACS (2013b). Close to Home: the First Six Months. New 
York, NY: NYC Administration for Children’s Services.
Bermudez, Ana and Mark Ferrante (2012). The New York City 
Juvenile Justice Reform Story: Realignment and the New York 
City Model of Juvenile Probation. Presentation at the CJJ 2012 
Southern Region Conference.
Butts, Jeffrey A. and Douglas N. Evans (2011). Resolution, 
Reinvestment, and Realignment: Three Strategies for 
Changing Juvenile Justice. New York, NY: Research and 
Evaluation Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City 
University of New York.
Bloomberg (2012). NYC Brings Juvenile Offenders Close 
to Home. Latest News. MikeBloomberg.com.
Butts, Jeffrey A. and Douglas N. Evans (2014). The Second 
American Crime Drop: Trends in Juvenile and Youth 
Violence. In Juvenile Justice Sourcebook, 2nd Edition 
(Wesley T. Church II, David Springer, and Albert R. Roberts 
(Editors), pp. 61-77. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cannon, Ashley, Richard Aborn and John Bennet (2010). 
Guide to Juvenile Justice in New York City. New York, 
NY: Citizens Crime Commission of New York City.
City of New York (2010). The Mayor’s Management 
Report Fiscal 2010. New York, NY: Author.
City of New York (2012). The Mayor’s Management 
Report Fiscal 2012. New York, NY: Author.
Division of Criminal Justice Service (2013). Office of Justice 
Research and Performance. Juvenile Justice Update for 
2012. Albany, NY: Author.
Fabelo, Tony, Nancy Arrigona, Michael D. Thompson, Austin 
Clemens, and Miner P. Marchbanks III (2015). Closer to 
Home: An Analysis of the State and Local Impact of 
the Texas Juvenile Justice Reforms. New York, NY: 
Council of State Governments Justice Center.
Governor Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile 
Justice. (2009). Charting a New Course: A Blueprint for 
Transforming Juvenile Justice in New York State. New 
York: Vera Institute of Justice.
New York City Department of Probation (2012). Dispositional 
Resource Guide. Unpublished.
New York City Independent Budget Office (2008). The Rising 
Cost of the City’s Juvenile Justice System. New York, 
NY: Author.
NYS Office of Children and Family Services (2011). Recidivism 
Among Juvenile Delinquents and Offenders Released from 
Residential Care in 2008. Albany, NY: Author.
NYS Office of Children and Family Services (2009). Annual 
Report. Youth Placed in OCFS Custody. Albany, NY: 
Author.
NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (2012).New York 
State Juvenile Re-entry Strategic Plan. A Report from the 
New York State Re-entry Task Force. Albany, NY: Author.
Sherman, Jackie (2015). Oversight-Overview of the 
Division of Youth and Family Justice’s Services and 
Programs for Remanded Youth. Testimony to the New 
York City Council, Committee on Juvenile Justice, January 30, 
2015. New York, NY: Administration for Children’s Services. 
Storey, Jeff (2010). In Sentencings, Judge Says Youths 
Should Not Go to Troubled Facilities. The New York Law 
Journal.
Vera Institute of Justice (2013). Brooklyn for Brooklyn 
Initiative. New York, NY: Author.
JohnJayREC.nyc
